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1How to Think the Otherness of Medieval Thought?
On Decortian Hermeneutics1
Bakos Gergely OSB
”One should acquire some wisdom when communicating with others.”
Thomas of Aquinas2
“If we cut ourselves off from experience and signs,  
we will be unable to see the presence of God.”
Jean Vanier3
1. Introduction 
The core message of this paper concerns methodology. Nevertheless, instead of going 
into minute and boring details of interpretative methods, it is rather aimed at a change 
of perspective in its readers. An entire honorable philosophical tradition represented 
by many great names, such as Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Husserl, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Pierre Hadot holds that in order to become a philoso-
pher one should undergo a radical change of perspective. Yet, just as in the religious 
life of a monk, no singular occurrence of personal conversion or μετανoια is sufficient, 
rather one has to grow into a sustained effort of changing one’s mind and habit through 
a lifetime, I contend that in the very same way a philosophical μετανoια can and should 
become habitual.4
 A tanulmány megjelent: Sapientiana 8 (2015/2) 40–60.
1 Herewith I should like to express my heartfelt gratitude to those people who made possible that I 
could present several versions of this paper on different occasions during the last academic year: to 
Max Latona and Joshua Tepley, at Saint Anselm College, in Manchester, New Hampshire; to Mark 
Webb, Anna Christina Soy Ribeiro and Jonathan Dorsey at The College of Arts and Sciences of Texas 
Technical University, Lubbock, Texas and finally to Marcello López Cambronero and my friend Má-
tyás Szalay at the Academia Internacional de Filosofía Instituto de Filosofía Edith Stein, in Granada, 
Spain. This paper heavily relies on the thought of the late Flemish scholar, Jos Decorte (1954–2001) 
whom I was privi leged to have as my first Doktorvater at the Institute of Philosophy at the Catholic 
University in Leuven, Belgium. Both Decorte’s person and his thought have been a great source of 
inspiration for my own work, which the present paper summarizes and further develops. (Cf. GerGely 
TiBOr BakOS: On Faith, Rationality and the Other in the Late Middle-Ages, A Study of Nicholas of Cu-
sa’s Manuductive Approach to Islam, Wipf and Stock, Eugen, 2011.) My gratitude naturally extends 
to Jos Decorte as well. 
2 “Debet homo acquirere sapientiam cum aliis communicando,” in his Sermon Puer Jesus proficiebat 
as quoted by HelmuT HOpinG: Weisheit als Wissen des Ursprungs. Philosophie und Theologie in der 
“Summa contra gentiles” des Thomas von Aquin, Herder, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1997, p. 1.
3 Jean Vanier: Signs. Seven Words of Hope, Paulist Press, New York / Mahwah NJ, 2013, p. 45.
4 The adjective philosophical delineates this kind of conversion from religious ones. A proper discus-
sion of the relationship between philosophical and religious conversion would need another study.
2The content of this conversion or change of perspective is related to a certain way or 
habit of looking at things, especially to our looking at philosophical knowledge. Turn-
ing around our perspective means here a refocusing our attention to the practical di-
mension of knowledge – or to employ a term borrowed from Michael Polanyi and Gil-
bert Ryle on the knowing how.5
To approach this search for a change of perspective can be expressed in the language 
of postmodernity as well: in this paper my interest in the first place concerns as to how 
we can approach the Otherness of medieval philosophical texts – or any Other for that 
matter. My general – admittedly not very original – hermeneutical position is that 
while the appearance of the Other, the yet not understood, the strange one prompts 
our rationality to produce different ways to deal with this Other, the exact responses 
are determined by the types of rationality involved. It seems to me that for thinking 
the Other a very special kind of rationality is required. I argue that a rationality that is 
able to think difference or transcendence is far from being the exclusive possession of 
post-modern philosophies. Based on an existential hermeneutics coming from the late 
Jos Decorte, I think that in this respect we can still learn from the medievals.6
The term “manuductive” captures well in many respects my concerns, therefore 
highlighting its meaning helps me clarify at the outset a basic point about medieval 
knowledge. The neologism manuductive has been consciously crafted in order to ex-
press what can be described as the practical, practice-bound or formal dimension of 
Nicholas of Cusa’s thought.7 In this connection I understand formal referring to the 
dimension of knowing-how. Practice-bound refers to Wittgenstein’s understanding 
of knowledge in need of a certain practice as its background, while the term practical 
has a broader scope than our practical rationality: its meaning lies much closer to the 
Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge as aiming at a certain human con-
duct.8
“Manuductive” comes from Latin “manuductio”, i.e. ‘(a) leading by the hand’. In 
basic agreement with many Cusanus researchers one can safely say that Nicholas’s use 
of knowledge is truly medieval in that respect, for him, knowledge should lead humans 
towards God.9 In other words, knowledge has an anagogic function and its movement 
expresses an intellectual habit typically medieval. As Cusanus would have it knowledge 
is a sort of manuductio. With Decorte I maintain that
5 For knowing what and knowing how cf. micHael pOlanyi: The Tacit Dimension, Doubleday, New 
York, 1967, and GilBerT ryle: The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1970.
6 See especially JOS DecOrTe: Eine kurze Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, Ferdinand Schö-
ningh, Paderborn, 2006; iD.: Geschichte und Eschatologie. Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie 
für das mittelalterliche Leben, in: Jan Aertsen and Martin Pickavé (ed.): Ende und Vollendung: Es-
chatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter, de Guyter, Berlin, 2002, pp. 150–161, and iD.: Sapientia: 
Between Superbia and Vanitas, in: Stephen F. Brown (ed.): Meeting of the Minds. The Relations 
between Mediaeval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, Brepols, Turnhout, 1998, pp. 477–
506.
7 See GerGely TiBOr BakOS: On Faith, Rationality, op. cit.
8 Cf. Metaphysics 1025b25: “all science (dianoia) is either practical, poetical or theoretical”. For Ar-
istotle ethics and politics were both practical sciences their aim being a special conduct (respectively 
of the individual and of the society). What in our everyday language is called practical knowledge, he 
would call poetical, i.e. technical for us.
9 For an exploration of this theme in relation to Nicholas’s De Concordantia Catholica see TiBOr BakOS: 
Recovering Nicholas’s Early Ontology: A reading of the ‘De concordantia catholica’, in: Jean-Michel 
Counet and Stéphane Mercier (eds.): Nicolas de Cues: les méthodes d’une pensée, l’Institut d’Études 
Médiévales, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2005, pp. 155–173.
3“A guidance [i.e. “manuductio”], as Nicholas explains it in the De Docta Igno-
rantia and also in the prologue to the De Visione Dei, always leads the belie-
ver from the sensible to the intelligible, and from the intelligible to the unfat-
homable mystery of the Godhead. Such a manuductio is always intended as a 
guidance [the same term] into mystical theology, that is to say into a vision of 
the Divine – to the extent that this is possible in this life (visio Dei).”10
2. Thinking Medieval Thought
In what follows, the Decortian hermeneutical approach will be outlined in some details 
and set in relation to more traditional approaches towards medieval thought, namely 
the Neo-Scholastic, the analytic, and the more historically minded ones. It should be 
especially emphasized that I consider my approach only as a corrective to these afore-
mentioned ones. My aim is thus not at all to discredit anything of value in them, but 
instead to learn from each and to go deeper. The following discussion contains my met-
hodological considerations and is concerned with medieval thinking and philosophy in 
general. It forms, as it were, the preconditions for a philosophical conversion.
2.1. On the Neo-Scholastic or Neo-Thomistic Approach
“Scholasticism” usually refers to theology and philosophy as it was taught at the me-
dieval schools and universities of Europe. Over against the advance of modern science 
and the criticism coming from modern philosophy this kind of intellectual culture has 
pretty much survived up to quite recently still shaping Catholic universities and semi-
naries. When in the year 1879 pope Leo XIII published his encyclical “Aeterni Patris,” 
explicitly dedicated to “the restauration of Christian philosophy”, the pope especially 
– albeit not exclusively – recommended Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) as the cham-
pion of philosophy in its true sense.11 This recommendation was to be understood as a 
reaction against modern thought since Descartes. The response to the encyclical from 
the Catholic world was both global and sustained. Journals, learned societies, new cur-
ricula came into being. Moreover, the emerging intellectual movement did not confine 
itself to seminaries and pontifical academies, but had its lasting effect on Catholic col-
leges and universities as well.
Neo-Scholasticism refers to this revival and development of medieval Scholasticism 
in Roman Catholic theology and philosophy. Neo-Scholastic Thomism or Neo-Thom-
ism narrows down the perspective on the reviving of the study of Thomas Aquinas. 
It must be clear, however, that Leo’s intention was not to establish one single school. 
Indeed, among the lasting positive results of his call has been the publication of critical 
editions of Aquinas and of many other medieval thinkers. Nor did Neo-Scholasticism 
lack original philosophers, such as Étienne Gilson (1884–1978) and Jacques Marit-
10 JOS DecOrTe: Ter inleiding, in Nicolaas van Cusa: Godsdienstvrede, Pelckmans, Kapellen, 2000, pp. 
7–46, here p. 36. I back up the claim that the manuductive concern is indeed central to Nicholas’s 
thought with successive examination of such important Cusanian works as De Docta Ignorantia, De 
Coniecturis, De Visione Dei, De Deo Abscondito, De Possest and De Non-Aliud. See GerGely BakOS: 
Faith, Rationality op. cit., pp. 149–196.
11 For an English translation of the encyclical see http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/
documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html (July 22nd, 2015).
4ain (1882–1873) – both of whom became influential in the US through their lectures. 
Neo-Scholasticism was also in dialogue with contemporary science and philosophy: 
for instance at the Institute of Philosophy at Leuven, Belgium natural science was also 
taught and the Jesuit Karl Rahner (1904–1984) engaged Heidegger’s thought. It must 
be added that the systematic character of much of Neo-Scholasticism is to be highly 
appreciated as its thinkers were aiming at a unity and exact conceptual framework 
(German Begrifflichkeit).12
This project has nevertheless some philosophical problems. An overall reliance on 
an Aristotelian ontology, i.e. a substance-metaphysics is problematic at least for two 
reasons. The emphasis on the substance or ουσια, as the self-sustained core of reality 
with the accompanying table of categories pushed the concept of relation into the back-
ground. The anthropological problem thus emerging is the following: Can we really 
think of a human being as a substance, i.e. as a reality first and foremost standing on 
its own? A more theological problem also arises: Can we think of the Trinitarian God 
within such a framework where substance has priority over against relation?
Another problematic point can be already seen from Leo’s encyclical, namely that 
Thomas’s thought was taken as an intellectual weapon to be wielded in a battle. This 
was surely a reinterpretation of the medieval Thomas: in his own age Aquinas was 
not so much regarded as the great figure of synthetizing between Aristotelianism and 
Christianity, solving the problem posed by a pagan philosophy but was rather per-
ceived as a part of the problem itself.13 It must be granted that Thomas was a good 
summarizer of much of medieval thinking – and he was much more than that: a great 
systematic thinker, one bold enough to learn from Aristotelian philosophy. His adop-
tion of Aristotelian thought into Christianity must be valued at least for two reasons. 
First, Aristotle’s was the only philosophical system that was available in Europe at that 
time. Secondly, its down-to-earth, realistic character recommended it for usage. But, 
as Nicholas of Cusa put it, you cannot think the divine mystery while using Aristotelian 
terms.14 The whole Christian tradition of negative and mystical theology reminds us of 
this same dimension. Later, during the council of Trent (1545–1563) Thomas’s works 
received special attention. However, using any thinker as a tool for apologetics has its 
own danger, i.e. a simplification of his or her thought.
After this very concise overview of Neo-Scholastic thought I contend that both the 
main strength and the weakness of the Neo-Scholastics lay in their quest for a “Chris-
tian philosophy”. This was an apologetic quest, a reaction against the perceived enemy 
of theological “modernism”.15 In such a battle Thomism can be easily transformed into 
a theological rationalism facing scientific rationalism as its enemy. No wonder that 
12 See e.g. WalTer BruGGer: Philosophisches Wörterbuch, Herder, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1976. Balázs 
Mezei, editor of the Hungarian translation of this work points out (in WalTer BruGGer: Filozófiai lex-
ikon, Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2005, p. 5) the systematic character of its entries as the special 
strength of this lexicon.
13 Cf. the famous condemnation at Paris in 1277. See e.g. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/condemna-
tion/ – July 22nd, 2015.
14 See his Li Non-Aliud in JaSper HOpkinS (trans.): Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not–Other. A Transla-
tion and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1979.
15 “Modernism” did not refer to a specific, unitary movement. It was rather a kind of  catchall term. See 
the corresponding entry in GeOffrey W. BrOmiley and others (eds.):  The Encyclopedia of Christian-
ity, Brill, Grand Rapids, Michigan / Cambridge, UK / Leiden / Boston, 2003; or the more concise 
discussion in ricHarD p. mcBrien and others (eds.): The HarpeCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, 
HarperSanFransisco, 1995. The letter work on p. 878 reads: “Rather than a system, Modernism was 
an intellectual orientation of Catholics who wrestled with the questions posed by modernity.” The 
5Neo-Scholastics were as much determined by a modern, scientific world-view as the 
enemy they set out to fight. They reconstructed their own version of Thomist thought 
in order to fight—for the most part—rather desperate cultural battles. Even though 
Neo-Thomist thought has not yet completely disappeared from the academic world, 
one can argue that nowadays at least in its traditional form it became rather obsolete 
and isolated. Basically, one has to agree with Philip Rosemann’s following judgement: 
“there is no point in flogging a dead horse. For Neo-Scholasticism is dead; mainly […] 
because it lost the institutional support of the Catholic Church after the Second Vati-
can council.”16 Since Rosemann’s is obviously a sociological-historical assessment of the 
facts, in the foregoing I have tried to show that Neo-Scholastic thought faces some truly 
philosophical problems as well.
Even if one shares with Scholastics an appreciation for the religious inspiration and 
content of medieval thought, it should be maintained that the researcher focusing on 
the formal or practical aspect can avoid more easily the danger of interpreting medie-
val thought according to the standards set by modern science. Two dangers more easily 
avoided in this way are a narrow, rationalistic interpretation of medieval texts and theo-
logical rationalism generally. 
2.2. On the Analytic Approach
Analytic philosophy, on the other hand, have had from the beginning the advantages 
of a more modest philosophical enterprise. The analytic philosopher can be content 
with analyzing medieval texts with the all the technical finesse of modern logic and 
semantic analysis. “Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, I have 
sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis; and I remain firmly 
persuaded, in spite of some modern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analy-
sing is progress possible”, writes Bertrand Russel, one of the founding fathers of the 
analytic tradition.17
It is worth of a note that both the interests and the methods of medieval scholastic 
thinkers and that of 20th century analytic philosophers have much in common. Scho-
lastic thought was fairly “analytic” in its actual execution. Thus in this respect there is a 
whole field of study for example in the comparison between modern symbolic logic and 
the scholastic Summae logicae, i.e. their textbooks on logic. It should also be noted that 
in spite of its origins in the Vienna circle there is a respectable part of analytic philoso-
phy dedicated to rational theology as demonstrated in the works of Alvin Plantinga or 
Richard Swinburne. One can also speak of Aquinas’s reception in the Analytic Tradi-
tion.18
Beyond any doubt an important positive feature of both Scholastic and analytical 
philosophy lies in their argumentative style, namely a shared emphasis on the use of 
same encyclopedia also gives the following warning: “the religious questions raised by modernity 
have not yet received their definite answers.”
16 Cf. pHilip W. rOSemann: Introduction. A Change of Paradigm, in: Id: Understanding Scholastic 
Thought with Foucault, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1999, pp. 1–17, here p. 4.
17 BerTranD ruSSel: My Philosophical Development, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1985, p. 11. Cf. also his 
The Philosophy of Leibniz, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 8: ”That all sound philosophy should begin 
with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof.” This second 
statement is obviously more nuanced, albeit it makes plausible that Russel might have had some 
awareness of the arbitrariness of his own position, nonetheless he refused to confront it. 
18 See Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Anthony Kenny, and especially John Haldane and ”Analytic 
Thomism”. 
6logic. A traditional view associates analytic philosophy with the so-called linguistic 
turn in the philosophy of the 20th century, though in its later developments one can 
perhaps speak of a post-linguistic phase. However, the analytic style is not to be mis-
taken as it “tends to precision and thoroughness about a narrow topic and to deem-
phasize the imprecise or cavalier discussion of broad topics.”19
Because of its well-defined and seemingly modest character, the analytic style should 
be recommended to anyone trying to learn about philosophy. Precisely the same mod-
esty, however, can make the analytic philosopher blind to other, less apparent dimen-
sions of medieval thought. In this way – just as in the case of Neo-Scholasticism – 
the strength and the weakness of the analytic approach are also connected to each 
other. When one identifies philosophical problems in a medieval text by applying the 
standards of modern analytic philosophy, the specific historical character of past dis-
cussions can easily escape our attention. Avoiding sweeping generalizations, cavalier 
statements and narrowing down the discussion can be accompanied by a lack of at-
tention to the context. And it is all too evident that it is possible to miss the whole of a 
forest because of our exclusive attention to individual trees.
A famous example from the history of modern science illustrates well what is at stake 
here. In a letter of dedication to pope Paul III (r. 1534–1549), the astronomer Nicho-
las Copernicus (1473–1543) declared that science has the right and the obligation to 
describe reality as it is. Moreover, this even holds, if this description should clash with 
Holy Scripture. The objective of the Bible is, however, not scientific knowledge, rather 
it follows the usual way people talk.20 Note that Copernicus was not only a mathema-
tician and an astronomer but also a canon of the Roman Catholic Church. His main 
scientific work entitled ”De revolutionibus orbium caelestium” was published in 1543, 
i.e. in the year of his death. Because of a serious illness, he had no real control on the 
publication. Through the unfortunate intervention of a Protestant theologian, Andreas 
Osiander (1498–1552), Copernicus’ famous book was issued with an anonymous pref-
ace, although the preface was neither signed, nor authorized by the author. Thus every-
one could read the preface as Copernicus’ own text.
Consequently, Copernicus’ work was received by his contemporaries as only offer-
ing a new model of reality and not actually describing how reality works. According to 
Osiander, namely, theology does have the job of describing reality, while science is only 
concerned with appearances.21 Scientific description is not necessarily a description of 
how things are, the “true” interpretation of reality is given in theology. Consequently, 
on this view, there exist two “truths”, to be found respectively on different levels and 
that is the reason why there can be no real contradiction between them.
This whole incident gives us a rather important warning: even studying a text of a 
hard science such as mathematical astronomy must be accompanied with the careful 
study of its story – in this case, its publication. By way of generalizing this point one 
can say that every author necessarily speaks from a certain context and in order to un-
derstand his or her message it is necessary to reconstruct that particular context.
19 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/analytic/ – April 2nd, 2015.
20 In this context Copernicus referred to the fourth-century Christian apologist Lactantius’s dictum: 
“Astronomy is written for astronomers” (Revolutions, 5). Cf. SHeila raBin: Nicolaus Copernicus, in 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2015 Edition, URL = <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/copernicus/>. (April 4th, 2014.)
21 “Since he [the astronomer] cannot in any way attain to the true causes, he will adopt whatever sup-
positions enable the motions to be computed correctly from the principles of geometry for the future 
as well as for the past …these hypotheses need not be true nor even probable” (Revolutions, xvi, as 
quoted in SHeila raBin: Nicolaus Copernicus, op. cit. (April 4th, 2015.)
7Fortunately, there are philosophers in the analytic camp who have recognized the 
importance of contextualization, and by consequence, of the history of their subject. 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1929–) following judgement should not come as a surprise:
“It thus turns out that, just as the achievements of the natural sciences are in 
the end to be judged in terms of achievements of the history of those sciences, 
so the achievements of philosophy are in the end to be judged in terms of the 
achievements of the history of philosophy.”22
As it is well known MacIntyre takes the same approach in his famous After Virtue.23 
It was thus no coincidence that historians criticized this book because for them it was 
too philosophical, while analytic philosophers criticized it precisely because they found 
the argument too historical.
Another example of a thinker coming from the analytical tradition and recognizing 
its limitations is Richard Rorty (1931–2007). I mention him especially because he be-
longs to postmodernity and also because to some extent I share his philosophical con-
cern. Moreover, I find his approach similar to the one I am to propose. 
As Rorty famously put it: “Anglo-American philosophy has been repeating the his-
tory it has been refusing to read, and we need all the help we can get to break out 
of the time capsule within which we are gradually sealing ourselves.”24 Clearly, the 
history of philosophy has a special philosophical significance for this American philos-
opher. Moreover, for Rorty contemporary philosophy at its best should be edifying. He 
writes the following:
“The attempt to edify (ourselves and others) may consist in the hermeneu-
tic activity of making connections between our own culture and some exotic 
culture or historical period […], the attempt to reinterpret our familiar sur-
roundings in the unfamiliar terms of our new inventions.”25
For Rorty this edifying philosophy is neither foundational nor constructive. It in-
volves a “poetic” activity of “thinking up new ways, new aims, or new disciplines”. The 
reinterpretation of the familiar is called here “the inverse of hermeneutics.”
Edification, of course, comes from 19th century bourgeois culture, especially from the 
German concept of Bildung. This concept can be seen an important bridge between 
Rorty’s and my approach.26 However, for Rorty his “project of finding new, better, 
22 alaSDair macinTyre: “The relationship of philosophy to its past”, in Philosophy in History. Essays 
on the Historiography of Philosophy, Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (eds.): 
University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 30-48, here p. 47. I am grateful for this reference to Paul 
Richard Blum, T. J. Higgins, S.J., Chair in Philosophy, at Loyola University, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Blum has written a related paper on the history of philosophy and it is expected to be published soon 
in Hungarian. (The title of the German manuscript reads “Antworten und Fragen. Die Historizität 
philosophisches Denkens”.)
23 alaSDair macinTyre: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, 19842.
24 ricHarD rOrTy: Derrida on Language, Being, and Abnormal Philosophy, in The Journal of Philos-
ophy, Vol. 74, No. 11 (Seventy-Fourth Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern 
Division Nov., 1977), pp. 673-681, here 676.
25 ricHarD rOrTy:  Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, University Press, Princeton, 1979, p. 394. Em-
phasis added.
26 Rorty, in this respect, was conscious of his own debt to Hans-Georg Gadamer and the latter’s herme-
neutic philosophy see ibid., p. 357.
8more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking”27 seems to be disconnected from the 
question of truth seeking and referentiality.28
It is my philosophical conviction that a solid epistemological realism is necessary in 
the following sense: what we are aiming and will arrive at during our reading of a me-
dieval text is not a personal whim, a fanciful idea or an individual invention. Because 
of the historical distance between us and the Middle Ages and the cultural changes that 
have taken place the medieval world does seem to us “exotic” – as Rorty put it.29 But 
any reinterpretation of our own surroundings with the help of some exotic concepts 
should really contribute to finding our own way in this world we inhabit. As the medi-
evals would put: it should make us happier, wiser, more human.
I think both MacIntyre’s and Rorty’s example clearly illustrate that within our con-
temporary academic context the analytic way of handling philosophical problems is 
only one possibility. At the very least it seems unlikely that this approach alone could 
exhaust the philosophical meaning of medieval texts.
2.3. The Intellectual Historian and the Hermeneutical Approach
From the foregoing one can gather that the approach I am proposing ought to be less 
apologetic than Neo-Scholasticism, without being merely analytical. My remarks on 
the context and the references to MacIntyre and Rorty all point towards a more histo-
rically minded and hermeneutical research.
There is naturally nothing new in the history of ideas or German Geistesgeschichte. 
Our contemporary intellectual historian has what can be called a more hermeneuti-
cally minded methodology in emphasizing the importance of the historical context for 
understanding a philosophical debate or a particular position. Much of contemporary 
research into medieval thought displays a similar humility. One is not interested in 
crude generalizations. Sweeping statements are to be wisely avoided. Caution is called 
forth against vain attempts to actualize medieval thought  hastily and unwittingly.
Yet writing any kind of intellectual history obviously runs the risk of becoming mere-
ly antiquarian or simply self-serving.30 An antiquarian attitude would mean reading 
the past only for its own sake and consciously or unconsciously avoiding raising any 
question of its contemporary relevance. Our own reading of the medievals should, of 
course, aim at objectivity and contextualization is a necessary support for that. Howev-
er, a really objective reading has to realize our own historical situation and our special 
presuppositions framing our own questions. Precisely because of the cultural gap sepa-
rating us from the Middle Ages we should not venture mindlessly into interpretation. If 
one does this consciously, the question of actualization of a special text can be delayed, 
put off temporarily as it were, for methodical reasons. Nevertheless, sooner or later one 
27 Ibid. p. 360.
28 Cf. DOn iHDe: Epilogue: Response to Rorty, or Is Phenomenology Edifying?, in: Id.: Consequences of 
Phenomenology, State University of New York Press, 1986, pp. 181–198, here: p. 197.
29 Although I think, actually, Rorty might have had some other cultures in mind.
30 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche: Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie 
für das Leben, § 1, in GiOrGiO cOlli – mazzinO mOnTinari (eds.): Kritische Studienausgabe, volume 
1, dtv, München, 1999, pp. 243–334. (For an English translation see frieDricH nieTzScHe: Untimely 
Meditations. On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, (transl. by Ian C. Johnston), 1874: http://
la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/330T/350kPEENietzscheAbuseTableAll.pdf – 4th April 2015.) This 
writing from Nietzsche clearly influenced Decorte, see JOS DecOrTe: Geschichte und Eschatologie, op. 
cit.
9will have to face this question – if for nothing else, because our students keep asking it: 
“Why to study this text? What does this have to do with us here and now?”31
Self-serving or self-absorbed I would call any reading of the past that would be gen-
erally satisfied with the conclusion that today we could and indeed do know better. 
Such an interpretation, in effect, amounts to say that the only gain to be had from our 
studies is to see the follies of past ages and the reflection of the brightness of our own 
intelligence.
Finally, any interpretation can be considered weak, faint-hearted or simply – to use 
a medieval term – vain (vana), if it fails to raise the question of truth and contempo-
rary philosophical and existential relevance. After all, in our scientific-pragmatic cul-
ture the study of philosophy in general, but that of medieval philosophy in particular 
seems to need some justification. We are not medievals: theology is not seen any more 
as the queen of sciences and philosophy as her handmaid (ancilla theologiae). In other 
words, philosophy does not have the same prestige of exercising the noblest human 
activity any more as it used to be seen both during antiquity and the Middle Ages. Our 
contemporaries do not regard philosophical activity as practicing the highest theologi-
cal virtue, i.e. Christian charity or as the highest human possibility, i.e. contemplation. 
I am aware that today at least within some contexts the very legitimacy of philosophy 
is called into question.32
Finally, a last problem with the history of ideas and the hermeneutical approach 
must be mentioned here. Whenever the question of truth is pushed all too easily to the 
background, this study alone can lead to historical relativism.33
2.4. An Existential Hermeneutics
The Decortian hermeneutics goes further than these other approaches in as much as its practitio-
ner – while being able to appreciate and even profit from all the aforementioned approaches – must 
also reflect on the existential importance of medieval knowledge.
Philosophy as represented by those great names listed at the very beginning of my 
paper – together with many others such as the Epicureans, the Stoics, the Existen-
tialists, the entire Phenomenological movement and even Kant – must in the end re-
connect us to reality, to human life.34 This is a tough call even to a teacher in any class 
on philosophy, but this seems especially difficult in relation to medieval thought. For 
instance the very formulations and conventions of the university genre of the quaestio 
can conceal the existential stakes and interests of a particular philosophical or theolog-
ical problem.
31 Contemporary biblical studies offer a similar challenge of a very learned, but antiquarian interpreta-
tion: the danger of alienating the text from us even more than a direct, unschooled reading would do. 
One might think one has learned every single detail one is able to gather concerning the text and its 
history but meanwhile its meaning evaporates. In such a case our historical study has only made the 
past to appear more incomprehensible to us.
32 This seems to be true as well in the US as in Hungary – albeit possibly for different reasons.
33 A similar danger seems to be present in Rorty’s thought.
34 Cf. in this respect Kant’s famous stance towards philosophy in its cosmopolitan sense: after having 
answered all the three main questions of speculative philosophy – i.e. What can I know? What can I 
hope fore? What shall I do? – there still remains the task of answering the essential question: What 
does it mean to be human? 
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My bottom line here is the conviction that knowledge seen from a medieval point of 
view must necessarily have an importance for one’s life. That is what we can learn from 
medievals. As they themselves could have put it, otherwise all our attempts aiming at 
true knowledge are either vanity, i.e. vanitas or an instance of (intellectual) pride, i.e. 
superbia. Besides the existential-practical orientation of medieval thought, its essen-
tially symbolic-religious and teleological character needs special emphasis. Knowledge 
for a medieval is essentially about seeing God, i.e. visio Dei and attaining happiness, 
i.e. beatitudo – notably already in this earthly life. By focusing on these dimensions of 
medieval thought, one will become not only more attentive to historical reality but one 
shall also realize that the same issues are still with us – even if nowadays they usually 
remain silent during academic discussions.
This is an important point, because in spite of the huge cultural differences, medi-
evals and we, moderns or post-moderns still inhabit the same human world. Some-
times, we are confronted with the same basic problems. This does not entail that we 
will always and necessarily have exactly the same answers, but it is possible that we can 
learn something from medieval questions and from the ways medievals answered those 
questions. Particularly, the questions concerning the existential-practical importance 
or the aim of knowledge for human life are still meaningful today. Nor has the symbol-
ic dimension been completely silenced. An important advantage of the approach I am 
proposing lies in its sensitivity to these dimensions.
Our Western intellectual tradition as a whole has had the tendency both to conceive 
and prefer knowledge as rather theoretical and speculative. This tendency can be de-
tected from Greek thinkers like Parmenides and Plato, through modern philosophers 
like Kant up to a phenomenologist like Edmund Husserl. In the course of the past 
century several important thinkers, such as Gilbert Ryle, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin 
Heidegger, Michael Polanyi and Michel Foucault have pointed us toward a less intel-
lectualistic picture. We have learned to see knowledge as both theoretical and practi-
cal. As both Heidegger and MacIntyre remind us this practice-related understanding 
of rationality is already to be found in the ethical works of no less of a thinker than 
Aristotle himself.
Turning to medieval thought, the Wittgensteinian concept of background practices 
can and must be applied. Usually these get hardly mentioned in the medieval texts 
themselves, yet medievals were well aware of them. The famous phrase faith seeking 
understanding (fides quaerens intellectum) from Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) 
means that the medieval intellectual was conscious of his own commitment to a spe-
cific way of life and to a specific community. He did not pretend to start from a default 
position and then try to reach a commitment through his thinking alone. Even some 
aspects of his own commitment, i.e. some dimensions of the medieval life world could 
be called into question and criticized – as long as this fundamental commitment was 
maintained.
To be mindful concerning medieval background practices both in their more general 
and more particular forms are also important because they may make us understand 
much better the significance of medieval questions. Why to ponder, for instance, the 
issue whether Christ had a purse or not? Behind this seemingly petty, if not ridiculous 
exegetical debate there stood the whole opposition and struggle between Mendicant 
and secular university professors and their respective rights to preach and to get paid.35 
35 One might phrase the same question in terms of tenure and funding nowadays.
11
In some cases, this silent or tacit dimension – to use a Polanyian phrase – can have 
direct philosophical significance. This ought to be especially clear concerning the so-
called arguments for the existence of God in the Middle Ages. What could possibly 
have been the point to prove the existence of God in a deeply religious culture? Sure 
enough, not everyone was well-informed about the doctrines of Christianity. There 
were indeed heretical people opposing certain religious doctrines. There were even 
some Jews and Moslems around. And to state the obvious not everyone was living 
faithfully to the tenets of Christianity. Yet, sociologically or culturally there was hardly 
any possibility to be a sceptic, an agnostic or an atheist during the Middle Ages. So, 
within such a context what could have been the significance of proving the existence 
of God?
Here one should recall the Anselmian phrase faith seeking understanding and one 
should read Anselm’s own arguments in his Monologion and Proslogion – i.e. read-
ing them in their entirety not just those bits and pieces featuring in our philosophy 
textbooks. There one finds the evidence that Anselm was well aware of the somewhat 
revolutionary character of his thought: he was explicitly asked by his own students to 
write on theology relying only on rational argumentation. The point for Anselm and for 
medievals in general was epistemological rather than purely ontological: through their 
faith they “knew” – or were at least convinced – that God existed, nevertheless they 
wanted to know how much of their faith could be rationalized, in other words how far 
human reason could reach. They were testing their own rationality on the deepest puz-
zles of existence. Familiarity with their argumentations will show that there were many 
differing perspectives on the question. Aquinas, for instance, famously objected to An-
selm’s “ontological” argument, while the very first critic of that argument was already a 
contemporary of Anselm, a fellow Benedictine monk, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers.36
Several of Anselm’s and Aquinas’s work also demonstrate the existential character of 
knowledge. That is to say knowledge for medievals must be related to salvation, hap-
piness or human flourishing. Consider, for instance the very medieval term “scientia” 
from which our contemporary word “science” comes. Surely it meant science, but not 
simply natural science. It could refer to any rationally ordered body of knowledge. In 
this sense theology was as much of a “science” as was philosophy. However, scientia 
was also synonymous with wisdom (sapientia). The “sacra scientia” of theology was 
not to be concerned with theory for the sake of theory but with theory for the sake of 
the practice of faith, i.e. the life of the believer and the Church. At least ideally theology 
as the queen of sciences had to be practical, pastoral and spiritual. This practice orient-
ed model of science was also operative throughout other, strictly speaking non-theo-
logical enterprises such as e.g. history, economy or medicine. The following quotation 
form Paul’s Letter to the Romans did not only feature in theological treatises:
„For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown 
it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine 
36 One can wonder on the significance of the following facts: there lived a Benedictine reader who crit-
icized Anselm’s thought in written form, apart from his criticism and name nothing else is known 
concerning this individual, yet Anselm did not only reply to this criticism but both Gaunilo’s counter-
argument and Anselm’s reply have been published together. Richard William Southern in his great 
monography on Anselm calls Gaunilo “truly remarkable” and points out that the controversy between 
him and Anselm “was conducted with such mutual regard and identity of purpose that it is hard to 
realize that a new philosophical issue had suddenly sprung into existence.” See r.W. SOuTHern: Saint 
Anselm. A portrait in a Landscape, University Press, Cambridge, p. 113.
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nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in 
the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.”37
This text speaking about the Gentiles and their failure to recognize God points to-
ward the possibility, indeed the necessity of seeing the invisible through and within 
the visible beings of the created world. In medieval art – throughout architecture and 
paintings – the same movement can be perceived as leading from the visible towards 
the invisible. One very clear example would be the Church of Saint Denis at Paris – 
considered to be the first Gothic church—as documented by Abbot Suger (1081–1151).
Yet, medievals were aware of the fact that to achieve this “vision” of God, i.e. seeing, 
knowing something from the invisible within and through the visible is far from being 
an easy enterprise. It needs a special “finesse”: to express it with a medieval term it is 
a question of sapientia (wisdom) or to say it with Ryle it involves a certain knowing 
how. This knowing how is related to a basic symbolic structure:
S – X –> Y.
Within this structure, for the human subject S the visible X is a sign or symbol of or a 
pointer towards the reality of an invisible Y. Note that this epistemological structure is 
strongly religious – after all God, being the greatest invisible, cannot be present in any 
other way only indirectly, i.e. through the help of the visible.
However, the same symbolic sensitivity is needed when one encounters the ethical 
and the ecological realms or even in the experience of human relationships and humor 
– not to mention art. In all these fields of our existence in some sense we are called 
to see beyond the surface, to transcend the obvious and the banal and to recognize 
something deeper, less superficial and less direct. We take a smile as an expression of 
gentleness or a frown as a sign of boredom. We can hear the birds singing in Vivaldi’s 
Four seasons, although in fact there are only instruments there playing the scores. We 
see a TV ad for aiding the third world showing a sick and starving child and we connect 
and feel responsible. We are struck by the beauty of air, land, see and saddened by 
their pollution and destruction through human hands, and a recognition downs on us 
of immense loss and guilt. We look lovingly on others and through the eyes of our love 
we – parents, grandparents, teachers, friends, and lovers – can see more in them than 
they themselves presently are able to acknowledge: we see their best possibilities. We 
watch a situation, listen to a remark or tell a joke and experience a hidden comicality, 
the space, freedom, and relief of good humor. All these examples strongly suggest that 
the symbolic experience is fundamental to our humanity. Yet it is equally true that in 
our contemporary culture this symbolic dimension is threatened to be lost because of 
the predominance of so-called scientific objective knowledge and short-term oriented 
rationality.
Reference has already been made to the medieval vision of reality having a teleolog-
ical character. In this respect the medieval universe was an Aristotelian one structured 
by a thoroughgoing finalistic order. In this ordered cosmos every single being had its 
goal and all these goals were connected with each other – even if important details of 
this teleology remained hidden from humans. This last specifying clause signals the 
fact that Aristotelian physics and ontology together with ancient cosmology were sup-
porters of this vision only in a secondary sense. They should be seen as the best theo-
37 Romans 1:19-20.
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retical explanations of natural phenomena that were available at that time. More fun-
damentally, though, this kind of scientific theory was an expression of a fundamental 
Christian and human intuition, i.e. the presence of meaning in the world.
That is the reason why Aristotelian teleology and medieval cosmology should not rep-
resent insurmountable problems for us today. Modern science heavily relies on mathe-
matics and there is no way mathematics can make sense of and employ the concepts of 
aim, goal, finality or the good.38 Consequently, modern science leaves this question out 
of consideration, since it simply cannot be dealt with through a scientific methodology.
Yet when one studies the human world – for instance while doing psychology or 
sociology – one has to acknowledge that we humans are driven by goals and values. It 
is a very human thing to see reality and ask the question of the meaning of a particu-
lar situation. As Viktor E. Frankl has shown us asking and answering the question of 
meaning – pace Freud – is a very healthy enterprise and indeed a therapeutic exercise. 
As Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche put it “He who has a Why to live for can bear almost 
any How.”39 Yet, Nietzsche failed to recognize that values, meanings and goals are not 
simply created by us as it were out of nothing. Meanings cannot be reasonably forced 
onto anyone; rather they have to be recognized and internalized by the human subject 
himself or herself. Only in this sense are they subjective. Yet in the very experience of 
these values, goals and meanings they present themselves as being encountered and 
discovered and not as arbitrarily invented but as possessing some objective status. Max 
Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann both argued for this; and MacIntyre in his After Virtue 
seems to be making the same point in relation to what he calls practices.40 Consequent-
ly, teleology cannot be left out of consideration.
Finally, beside the Aristotelian dimension of medieval thinking its Platonic dimen-
sion should be reconsidered. In Plato there is a sense of a certain teleology, a direct-
edness towards the Good that seems less rigorously “scientific” and more suggestive. 
Through the writings of the church fathers the Platonic tradition has heavily influenced 
the Middle Ages. This tradition points toward a surplus of meaning within and beyond 
the confines of the visible universe. The symbolic presence founds also ample expres-
sion in this kind of thinking.
38 It is all the more interesting to see that some notion of teleology seems to be creeping back through 
the backdoor, as it were, into recent biology and cosmology.
39 Cf. frieDricH nieTzScHe: Götzen Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert, in Gi-
OrGiO cOlli – mazzinO mOnTinari (eds.): Kritische Studienausgabe, volume 1, op. cit., pp.55 –161, here 
60-61. This dictum was one of Frankl’s favorite.
40 Op. cit. 175: “By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially estab-
lished cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized 
in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and par-
tially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, 
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.  Tic-tac-toe 
is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of 
football is, and so is chess.  Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a 
practice; farming is.  So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of 
the historian, and so are painting and music.” [Emphasis from the author.]
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2.5. Comparison of the Different Approaches
To Neo-Thomism
A Decortian existential hermeneutics can respect the Aristotelian framework of medie-
val thought precisely as a framework, without, however, being committed to it. Notably 
this approach enables one to think humans as fundamentally relational.41 By laying the 
emphasis on the knowing how it avoids the danger of (theological) rationalism.
While this approach is not directly or overtly apologetic, one might still wonder 
whether it qualifies as a kind of Christian philosophy. The short answer to this ques-
tion is that this existential hermeneutics is certainly inspired by medieval Christianity, 
but it is not simply Christian in virtue of the fact that it reflects on or endorses certain 
Christian themes or doctrines. Rather its first emphasis lies on the formal aspect of 
knowledge, i.e. on questions of how to go about one’s knowledge, how to use it, how to 
relate to it, how to contribute with it to human well-being, virtue and maturity. Thus 
if my Decortian hermeneutics is a Christian philosophy then it is Christian first and 
foremost in this formal sense of the expression.42
A more serious objection concerns the philosophical status and dimension of this 
approach. That is to ask the question whether a Decortian hermeneutics can be still 
autonomous philosophy. After all, even Christian sources confirm that the experience 
of the visio Dei is ultimately dependent on divine grace. Does this circumstance pose 
no threat to philosophy as autonomous human thinking?
This problem needs a complex answer. First, one should be reminded that the pres-
ent paper is mainly concerned with a way of making (existential) sense of (medieval) 
philosophical texts. Furthermore, the visio in this life discussed briefly is neither the 
ultimate eschatological beatitudo, nor some parapsychological state of mind. First and 
foremost it is an intelligent – that is to say not irrational – insight into reality. While 
no visio Dei is possible without the gift of divine grace, according to Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans it is a basic human possibility – even for non-Christians as the Apostle em-
phasized it.43 Since this visio is nothing else than a limited insight into the mystery of 
being here and now (in via), it is possible to work towards it already in this life, within 
this world.44 It should be especially emphasized that God in Godself is not the exclu-
sive target of the symbolic vision. Indeed, the realm of other possible targets offers an 
infinite field for investigation: God in creatures, ethical values, human relationships, 
humor, art, etc.45
To Analytic Philosophy
Decortian hermeneutics is able to profit from philosophical analysis, but in my opinion 
it gives a more full-fledged form to philosophical modesty. Narrowing down the dis-
cussion through logical or linguistic analysis can in fact function as a counterfeit sort of 
41 Cf. beatitudo, visio Dei.
42 Thus in its own philosophical way Decortian hermeneutics is a humble protest “against that coarse 
familiarity with sacred things which is busy on the lip, and idle in the heart” as Charles Dickens so 
poignantly put it in his Preface to the First Cheap Edition of Pick wick Papers 
(see http://dickensprints.com/book-titles/the-pickwick-papers/authors-preface.html – Ju ly 22nd, 
2015.
43 See the quotation in section 2.4. of the present paper.
44 Cf. the possibility and justifiability of rational theology and philosophical ethics in Christianity.
45 I am grateful for Balázs Mezei for raising these two objections.
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modesty, i.e. a polite way of avoiding certain otherwise important questions.46 I think 
both MacIntyre’s and Rorty’s works confirm this point. The approach I am proposing 
is certainly sensitive to the historical-cultural context and in this it is similar to Rorty’s 
approach. The difference lies in the fact that the existential hermeneutics is committed 
to epistemological realism. Howerer connection to Rorty is important to me, since it 
offers the possibility of a truly philosophical appreciation of postmodernity.
To Intellectual History / Hermeneutics
My comparison with Rorty’s example has already pointed toward that appreciation of 
history and a clearer focus on the existential dimension. Its connection to real life is 
evident and this circumstance fends off any kind of Nietzschean criticism.
Admittedly, historical relativism still remains an open question, but precisely for my 
approach it appears less of a problem. Truth here is tested in and through existence. 
This anchoring of truth on the existential level, in the knowing how secures one’s posi-
tion and fends off historical relativism. The visio aimed at can indeed only be a limited 
insight into the mystery, but nevertheless it is a valid one. To put it with Nicolaus Cusa-
nus: it is a conjecture (coniectura).47
46 I thank István Fehér M. and Balázs Mezei for reminding me of this point.
47 On Cusanian conjecture see his De coniecturis, for an English translation consult http://jasper-hop-
kins.info/DeConi12-2000.pdf – July 22nd, 2015.
